Hasil Pencarian  ::  Simpan CSV :: Kembali

"Ownership which was concentration is one of the characteristic most companies in Indonesia, in the reality have tendency to generate debt agency problem between majority shareholder and creditor. Desire to keep holding to conduct company make majority taking debt as especial choice of financing of company. Beside that using debt will give entire all benefit to majority if success investment, and creditor follow to account loss if failure investment. This phenomenon proven of crisis moment, where according to finding of ADB (Asian Development Bank) the root cause the happening of crisis was the ownership which is more concentrated, less effective of observation him by director of board, market which not yet personated controller of company and 70% financing of company dominated with loan not yet accompanied with enough observation at creditor. Company in Indonesia is generally owned by foreign multinational company or foreigner, domestic company or local people or owned by state. This study will check the company with multinational majority and company with non multinational majority, where have been proved at research before by Suad Husnan (2001) that company with majority multinational have better than company with majority is not multinational, with period of research before the happening of crisis (year 1996) and the happening of crisis (year 1997- 1998). In this study use samples 15 companies with multinational majority shareholder and 29 companies with majority shareholder non multinational. Governance Corporate monetary aspect will indicated with DER (Debt Equity Ratio) and monetary performance will indicated with ROE (Return on Equity) as accountancy indicator and with abnormal of return as capital market indicator. For know how to policy of performance and financing of company will be used by t-test which analyst DER, ROE and both company group. After that, regression used to test influence of DER to ROE, then regression with variable of dummy conducted to know the changed of regression parameter for the periods of crisis and after crisis."

"Tujuan penelitian ini untuk menguji pengaruh corporate governance (dewan direksi, dewan komisaris, dan komite audit) dan pengungkapan sukarela terhadap asimetri infonnasi. Proksi untuk asimetri informasi adalah perubahan spread (selisih spread antara periode announcement dan non announcement). Penelitian ini menggunakan 75 sampel, dengan kriteria telah menerbitkan laporan tahunan dan tersedia tanggal publikasi. Penelitian ini menggunakan indeks corporate governance (dewan direksi, dewan komisaris, dan komite audit) yang dikembangkan oleh Rahadian dan Siregar, (2007) dan Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, dan Lu (2008). Sedangkan indeks pengungkapan sukarela menggunakan instrumen yang dikembangkan oleh Chau dan Gray (2002). Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis regresi berganda untuk menguji pengaruh corporate governance (dewan direksi, dcwan komisaris. dan komite audit) dan pengungkapan sukarela terhadap asimetri informasi. Penelitian ini menemukan : (1) dewan direksi dan komite audit mempunyai pengaruh negatif dan signifikan terhadap perubahan spread. Hasil ini konsisten dengan hipotesis yang berarti keduanya mempunyai peranan penting dan efektif untuk menurunkan perubahan spread; (2) berkebalikan dengan harapan, dewan direksi mempunyai pengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap perubahan spread. Hasil ini mengindikasikan bahwa fungsi dewan komisaris relatif masih kurang efektif; (3) konsisten dengan hipotesis, pengungkapan sukarela mempunyai pengaruh negatif dan signifikan. Hasil ini menyatakan bahwa semakin tinggi pengungkapan sukarela maka akan semakin rendah teljadinya perubahan spread.

---

The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance (board of director, board of commissioner, and audit committee) and voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry. Proxy for infonnation asymmetry is change spread (difference between spread announcement period and non announcement period). This research uses 75 samples, which released annual report and available released date. This research uses corporate governance index (board of director, board of commissioner, and audit committee) which depeloyed by Rahadian dan Siregar (2007) and Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, and Lu (2008). Meanwhile voluntary disclosure index uses instrument which developed by Ohau and Gray (2002). This research uses multiple regression analysis to examine the effect of corporate governance (board of director, board of commissioner, and audit committee) and voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry. This research finds : (1) board of director and audit committee have negative and signillcant effect on change spread. This result is consistent with hypothesis which means both of them have important and effective role to decrease change spread; (2 ) in contrary with expectation, board of commissioner has positif and significant effect on change spread.Jhis result indicates that the function of board of commissioner relatively still ineffective; (3) consistent with hypothesis, voluntary disclosure has negative and signifiGant effect on change spread. This result suggested that high voluntary disclosure will lower change spread."

"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menemukan bukti empiris mengenai dampak dari tata kelola perusahaan terhadap manajemen laba dan penghindaran pajak pada perusahaan publik. Ruang lingkup penelitian ini adalah perusahaan listed yang terdaftar pada BEI kecuali perusahaan keuangan, real estate, dan telekomunikasi untuk manajemen laba sedangkan penghindaran pajak kecuali perusahaan keuangan dan effective tax rate yang bernilai positif serta tidak lebih dari 1. Untuk menguji hubungan tata kelola perusahaan dengan manajemen laba, peneliti menggunakan variabel discretionary accruals, sedangkan untuk penghindaran pajak peneliti menggunakan variabel effective tax rate. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa tata kelola perusahaan yang baik secara negatif berpengaruh signifikan terhadap manajemen laba, kecuali jumlah rapat komite audit, kepemilikan institusional, persentase dewan komisaris independen berpengaruh postif, sedangkan untuk penghindaran pajak jumlah rapat komite audit, jumlah dewan komisaris, dan persenatase dewan komisaris independen berpengaruh positif. Sementara untuk komponen tata kelola perusahaan jumlah rapat komite audit dan jumlah dewan komisaris tidak berpengaruh untuk manajemen laba, dan untuk penghindaran pajak komponen kepemilikan institusional, jumlah komite audit dan jumlah komite audit yang memiliki latar belakang keuangan tidak memiliki pengaruh signifikan.

---

This study aims to find empirical evidence regarding the impact of Corporate Governance to Earnings Management and Tax Avoidance . The scope of this study is listed companies on BEI except for financial, real estate, and telecomunication companies for earnings management, while tax avoidance except for financial companies. To test the relationship of corporate governance with earnings management, the researcher uses discretionary accruals variable, while for tax avoidance the researcher use variable effective tax rate. The results show that good corporate governance negatively significant affects earnings management, unless institutional ownership, percentage of independent board commissioners, and number of audit committee meetings have positively affects, while for tax avoidance the number of audit committee meetings, boards of commissioners, and percentage of independent board commissioners have positive affects. While for corporate governance components the number of committee audit meetings, and board of commissioners has no effect on earnings management, also for the tax avoidance component number of audit committee, institutional ownership, and the audit commite that have financial expertise doesn’t have a significant effect."

"Krisis ekonomi yang melanda Asia khususnya Indonesia pada pertengahan tahun 1997 diyakini karena lemahnya penerapan Good Corporate Governance (GCG) di dalam sistem perbankan nasional dan korporasi kita. Tesis ini membahas mengenai penerapan Good Corporate Governance (GCG) di Indonesia dimana dapat didorong dari dua sisi, yaitu etika dan peraturan. Penelitian yang dikembangkan adalah penelitian normatif.Hasil dari penelitian ini, pada dasarnya dari sisi peraturan, Undang-Undang Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 tentang Perseroan Terbatas telah menerapkan prinsip-prinsip dasar GCG yaitu transparansi, kewajiban, pertanggungjawaban, kemandirian dan yang terakhir kewajaran dan kesetaraan. Akan tetapi karakteristik Perseroan di kawasan Asia Tenggara khususnya Indonesia adalah tingginya konsentrasi kepemilikan dan pengendalian pada sekelompok keluarga/grup usaha. Sebagaimana yang terjadi di dalam manajemen Bank X dimana pemegang saham pengendali ikut dalam mencampuri urusan operasional Perseroan yaitu dengan mempengaruhi kebijakan manajemen Perseroan. Atas tindakannya tersebut pemegang saham telah melanggar prinsip akuntabilitas yang berujung tidak independe-nya masing-masing Organ Perseroan.

---

Economy crisis that hitted in Asia especially Indonesia in the middle of the 1997 believed because the weakness application of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) in our national banking system and our corporation. This thesis focus to the application of good corporate governance (GCG) in Indonesia where pushed from two sides, that is ethics and regulation. This research uses normative research.

The result of normative research, basically from regulation side, Limited Liability Regulation Number 40th,2007 has applied base principles GCG that is Transparency, Accountability, Responsibility, Independence and Fairness. But the characteristics of company at south east asia especially indonesia is highly property concentration and control by group family / group business. In the same manner as happened in X Bank management where does controller shareholder get involved in company operational activity with influence company management policy. Cause of his action, shareholder has broken accountability principle pointed each of Organ Perseroan can not work independent."

"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana pengaruh Corporate Governance, kepemilikan keluarga dan umur perusahaan terhadap Corporate Social Performance baik dimensi environment, dimensi product quality maupun dimensi community relations. Penelitian ini juga ingin menguji pengaruh Financial Performance terhadap asosiasi Corporate Governance dengan Corporate Social Performance. Corporate Governance dinilai berdasarkan indeks yang dikeluarkan oleh Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship (IICD), sedangkan untuk Corporate Social Performance menggunakan kriteria pernilaian yang digunakan oleh Greening dan Turban (2000) dimana pengukuranny berdasarkan dimensi yang digunakan lembaga KLD (Kinder,Lydenberg and Domini). Pengujian hipotesis menggunakan model regresi logistik dan sampel sebanyak 239 perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama tahun 2008. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa corporate governance memiliki pengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap probabilita high corporate social performance baik dimensi environment, dimensi product quality maupun dimensi community relations. Kepemilikan keluarga memiliki pengaruh positif walaupun lemah terhadap probabilita high corporate social performance dimensi product quality sedangkan umur perusahaan memiliki pengaruh positif walaupun lemah terhadap probabilita high corporate social performance dimensi environment dan dimensi product quality. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa financial performance tidak memperkuat hubungan corporate governance dengan probabilita sebuah perusahaan memiliki high corporate social performance baik dimensi environment, dimensi product quality maupun dimensi community relations.

---

This research aims to determine whether corporate governance, family ownership, and firm age influence corporate social performance in environment dimension, product quality dimension, and community relations. In addition, this research also would like to know the effect of financial performance on the association between corporate governance and corporate social performance. Corporate governance viewed by an index issued by Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship (IICD), while corporate social performance is measured by KLD?s criteria that used by Greening and Turban (2000).

Hypothesis testing used logistic regression with sample of 239 companies that are listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2008. These result indicate that companies with good corporate governance will have bigger probability getting high corporate social erformance in those dimensions. Family ownership has weak influence on corporate social performance in product quality dimension and firm age also has weak influence on corporate social performance in product quality dimension and community relations dimension. Yet, financial performance is proven that there is no influence of financial performance to the association between corporate governance and corporate social performance."

"[ABSTRAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mempelajari pengaruh political connections, corporate governance, dan blockholders ownership terhadap corporate cash holdings sebagai proxy dari agency problem. Penelitian dilakukan menggunakan data panel dari 141 data observasi pada periode 2005, 2008 dan 2011 di Indonesia. Political connections diukur menggunakan variabel dummy. Perusahaan diidentifikasi memiliki political connections apabila terdapat setidaknya satu pemegang saham besar atau top officers yang menjadi anggota parlemen, menteri, atau menjalin hubungan dekat dengan politikus terkemuka atau partai. Corporate governance diukur menggunakan Corporate Governance Index dari Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship. Blockholders ownership diukur menggunakan variabel continuous berupa jumlah kepemilikan saham serta menggunakan variabel dummy yang merupakan pengelompokan untuk kepemilikan blockholders rendah, moderat, dan tinggi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa political connections dan corporate governance terbukti berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap corporate cash holdings. Keberadaan hubungan politis pada perusahaan dapat meminimalkan agency problem karena para politisi yang terlibat dalam perusahaan memanfaatkan jabatan dan kekuatan politiknya untuk keuntungan perusahaan. Penelitian ini juga memperkuat argumen bahwa implementasi corporate governance yang baik dapat meminimalkan agency problem dalam perusahaan. Blockholders ownership tidak terbukti signifikan berpengaruh terhadap corporate cash holdings baik secara linier maupun non linier. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena definisi blockholders yang kurang mencerminkan kepemilikan yang spesifik.

---

ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm’s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm’s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm’s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven., The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm’s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm’s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm’s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.]"